LONDON — The late Queen Elizabeth II was asked to step in and stop Russian-British media tycoon Evgeny Lebedev getting a place in the House of Lords, it has been reported.
The Guardian — citing forthcoming documentary “Boris, the Lords & the Russian Spy: Dispatches” — said Monday that British government officials contacted Buckingham Palace in July 2020 to ask whether the monarch would block a peerage for Lebedev, the son of oligarch and former KGB officer Alexander Lebedev.
The place in the U.K.’s upper chamber — which was ultimately waived through — had been recommended by then-Prime Minister Boris Johnson, who drew political heat for the move amid wider concerns about Russian influence on British politics.
Alexander Lebedev and his son bought newspaper titles the Evening Standard and the Independent more than a decade ago. The elder Lebedev was sanctioned by Canada last year in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
The queen is constitutionally entitled to halt an appointment to the U.K.’s unelected upper chamber, but the palace reportedly refused the 2020 request amid concern about involving the late monarch in a political controversy.
David Clark, a Labour peer and member of the House of Lords Appointments Commission (Holac) which vets peerages, told the Guardian that government officials “were really concerned about” the appointment, and believed it was “a major, major mistake.”
A spokesperson for Johnson told the paper that the ex-prime minister remained “fully supportive of Lord Lebedev’s appointment.”
They added: “As the government has previously confirmed, Holac and security advice was not overruled. The proper process was followed. As this program makes clear, there were no concerns about Lord Lebedev.
“Lord Lebedev is a British citizen. He has invested in British journalism and has extensively criticized the Russian regime. It is not right to judge people on the basis of their country of birth or the sound of their surname. This is a tiresome and xenophobic campaign.”
A spokesperson for Evgeny Lebedev told the Channel 4 documentary team: “He is familiar with the security advice and understands no such attempt was made by the security services to persuade the PM to withdraw the nomination.”
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<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/KN_Vm6uv-knKD3mlDnVITnn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="Class action question turns into procedural dispute " title="Class action question turns into procedural dispute "> <p>Another day at the Supreme Court and, suitable for the way this term has gone, another case that pretty clearly does not belong before the court. The justices granted review in <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/laboratory-corporation-of-america-holdings-v-davis/"><em>Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings v. Davis</em></a><em> </em>to decide whether a district court can certify a class action that includes claimants who in fact have not suffered any cognizable injury. Here, for example, a group of blind individuals filed suit against Labcorp when it installed automated check-in kiosks in its facilities in the COVID-19 era. The class contends that the kiosks discriminate against the blind, and the parties spent a lot of time in the district court arguing about the suitable bounds of the class. At one point, the court defined a class that excluded all who did not know about or did not want to use the kiosk, on the theory that they were not injured. Later, the district court modified the definition to include everybody who came into a clinic, whether they did or did not want to use the kiosk.</p> <span id="more-505568"></span> <p>Labcorp’s arguments in the court challenge that second definition, but the problem is that it only appealed the first definition, which is strictly limited to those who can claim an injury from the presence of the kiosks. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit held that because Labcorp did not appeal the second definition, it did not have jurisdiction to review that second definition. So now the justices have a case with briefs challenging the propriety of a definition that the defendant never appealed.</p> <p>Predictably, a large share of the argument was about what the justices should do about that. For the most part, the sentiment (expressed repeatedly by Justices Amy Coney Barrett and Sonia Sotomayor) was that the court has no reason to address the second definition and that it should send the case back to the lower courts to let them consider whether there is any way for Labcorp still to challenge that definition.</p> <p>To the extent the justices addressed the question on which they granted review, the justices appeared skeptical of Labcorp’s position. The leaders on that point were Justices Elena Kagan, Ketanji Brown Jackson, Neil Gorsuch, and Sotomayor. Labcorp contended that the members of the class necessarily have to share the same injury to be in the class, but the justices seemed to think that class definitions are quite “fluid,” as Sotomayor emphasized.</p> <p>The group could not see any reason why the question of precisely who was injured needs to be settled up front. For them, the only requirement in the rules is that the court needs to find a way to sort the “wheat from the chaff” — the injured from the uninjured — before the court finally awards damages. </p> <p>Sotomayor, recalling her time as a trial judge, commented that class definitions “get amended constantly,” and that “it’s not until the judgment is entered that you have to … identify who’s been injured or not.” </p> <p>Seconding Sotomayor’s sentiment, Kagan commented that “the court is not doing anything with respect to those claims until the court actually provides damages, … and as long as the court figures this question out before the court actually does anything with respect to those claims, that seems to me good enough.” </p> <p>Gorsuch seemed persuaded by the practicalities, suggesting that from his perspective, “overall, looking at the whole thing, it’s manageable. There are at least some common questions. The named plaintiffs are generally typical and common issues predominate.” </p> <p>When Sopan Joshi, representing the government, argued that the problem is that the class doesn’t have “commonality” unless the plaintiffs shared a common injury, Gorsuch and Kagan both objected strenuously. Gorsuch interjected: “Hold on. … I had understood it as one issue has to be common, and that that has to be predominant. …. Now you’re telling me that Article III, and Article III alone, must be satisfied by everyone at the outset.” When Joshi insisted that all in the class must share a common injury, Gorsuch reiterated his point even more firmly: “No, they don’t all have to be common. There has to be a common question that predominates over others.”</p> <p>Apparently bemused by his discussion of commonality, Kagan asked Joshi to look back at the past 70 years of the court’s class action cases. “[I]t strikes me that if you look at all the classes that have been certified by that point, you’re always going to be able to find people for idiosyncratic reasons who don’t share the same injury, who don’t have standing, and all that’s never been seen as kind of the end all and be all,” she said. To do that, Kagan continued, “we have to explode everything. So it seems very inconsistent to me with the way class actions have been practiced for many decades.”</p> <p>That’s not to say that there was no sympathy for Labcorp’s position. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Brett Kavanaugh commented on the “elephant in the room” – that the very certification of a class often can force defendants to settle – but they did not suggest any way to avoid the procedural obstacle to reaching the question.</p> <p>Although the justices have shown some interest this year in reaching out to decide the questions to which they devoted an hour of oral argument, this really seems to be one where there is little appetite for finding a way to reach that question. When skepticism about getting to the question includes Barrett, Gorsuch, Sotomayor, and Kagan, it is a little hard envisioning a majority finding a way around the obvious difficulties. </p>
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