Posted by 
Peter Ricketts is a retired British senior diplomat, life peer and chair of the Lords European Affairs Committee. He served as the U.K.’s first national security adviser under former Prime Minister David Cameron and was former ambassador to France and to NATO.
Wars can clarify complex issues and sharpen the most difficult choices. And in keeping with this pattern, one of the effects of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — the most serious threat to European security since 1945 — has been to completely change the context of Britain’s relationship with the European Union.
This is what the European Affairs Committee of the House of Lords called the “Ukraine effect” in a wide-ranging report published this week, assessing the impact of Russia’s aggression on relations between the United Kingdom and the EU, particularly in the areas of foreign, defense and security policy.
Under my chairmanship, the committee launched an inquiry into this subject in July 2023, focusing on three areas of cooperation that have developed since the invasion — sanctions against Russia, the EU-U.K. defense relationship and the reconstruction of Ukraine. We then received oral and written evidence from many witnesses, and questioned Foreign Secretary David Cameron and the Minister for Europe and North America Leo Docherty.
Overall, the committee found much to be positive about in each of these areas of cooperation. And we’ve recommended building on this successful experience of ad hoc cooperation with more structured arrangements for working together on foreign policy in the future.
As it stands, however, any reduction in American support for Ukraine, and for European security more broadly, could leave Europe badly exposed. Therefore, the U.K., the EU and its member countries need to prepare for a scenario in which they may have to take on more of the burden.
Evidence presented to the committee on sanctions showed that coordination between the U.K., the EU and the U.S. on imposing an unprecedented range of measures worked well overall. The same goes for the U.K.’s new post-Brexit sanctions regime — although the pace at which these were introduced sometimes saw both the Treasury and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office swamped with inquiries and license applications.
Sanctions can only have impact if they’re implemented and enforced effectively. And we heard worrying evidence about Russia’s growing ability to circumvent sanctions through third-party states, as well as their uninsured shadow tanker fleets. Witnesses also drew attention to some weaknesses in the U.K.’s performance in terms of enforcing sanctions. Thus, in our report, we’ve pressed the government to set out the actions they’re taking to put this right.
Furthermore, the next big issue for sanctions policy is likely to be the use of frozen Russian assets for Ukraine’s reconstruction. While some witnesses noted the legal complexities this would entail, Cameron made the tantalizing comment that “there’s a legal route to doing this.” And the committee has thus asked for further details.
Meanwhile, as a committee, we found it incomprehensible that the deal reached with Russian oligarch Roman Abramovich in March 2022 — which would see the proceeds from the sale of the Chelsea Football Club go to the victims of the Ukraine conflict — remains mired in legal processes.
While Doherty informed us that there’s an ongoing disagreement between the relevant parties about who exactly should benefit from this deal and where the money should be spent, Cameron was clear that it needs to be used for humanitarian causes in Ukraine. The committee agrees on this and has called for urgent action to get the money to those who desperately need it.
Looking to the longer term, the committee then took on the pressing issue of how the lessons learned from the last two years of intensive work on sanctions could be retained and applied in the next crisis. And despite government reservations, we’ve found wider sanctions policy to be a subject on which the U.K. and the EU should systematically work together.
Moving on to the EU-U.K. defense relationship — another area in which effective coordination mechanisms have developed — our report welcomed British leadership within Europe on the supply of military support for Ukraine. The crucial issue now is sustaining levels of support to Kyiv for as long as it takes to reverse Russian aggression.
When the committee looked at the details of the U.K.’s engagement with the EU’s complex defense-industrial system, however, we found reasons for concern. Firstly, a year after the U.K.’s application to participate in an EU Military Mobility project, this is still being held up. Moreover, the European Defense Fund, with its €8 billion budget for armaments procurement, is hemmed in with protectionist rules, which present a major obstacle to participation by third-party countries like the U.K.
On this, our report has urged the government to press for rule changes, and we’ve recommended the government seek an administrative arrangement with the European Defense Agency, which might be a useful stepping stone toward wider cooperation.
Ultimately, Ukraine’s reconstruction will be a colossal program, requiring huge amounts of international assistance over the course of many years. The U.K. is already closely involved in its planning — including through the Multi-agency Donor Coordination Platform — and has real expertise to offer from previous reconstruction programs. Britain is well-placed to take a leading role here — in close conjunction with the EU — particularly when it comes to tackling corruption, which will be vital to build the confidence of private sector donors so they invest in Ukraine.
But what will be the longer-term impact of Russia’s invasion on relations with our European neighbors? The EU has made a concerted effort to take on a bigger geopolitical role as a result of this war. And while it remains to be seen whether this will be durable, any shift in the bloc’s foreign policy will inevitably have implications for the U.K.’s national security.
Moreover, the next round of EU enlargement — including Ukraine — is of major strategic significance. And although the U.K. will have no direct influence on the process, it shares the bloc’s overall objective in pursuing enlargement for greater stability and security. The British government should, therefore, do all it can to help candidate countries prepare for accession.
The return of full-scale war to the Continent is a stark reminder that Britain and its European neighbors have the same interests when it comes to freedom and security, and they are much more effective when working together. This means the U.K. must ensure there are effective arrangements for close cooperation on the major foreign policy challenges that lay ahead.
