Latin America: several countries look to combat gang violence by fighting fire with fire

Gangs have an enduring presence in Latin America. They have existed as power brokers, illicit economic actors and spoilers in the developmental processes of several countries. And yet, despite their power and influence, the gangs have long been regarded merely as irritants – always present but never strong enough to rock the boat.

Fast forward to the present day and we are presented with a whole new configuration. Criminal gangs have become a critical power to reckon with. From island nations like Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to big economic powerhouses such as Brazil and Mexico, gang menace is spreading fast.

In some instances, gangs have come to challenge the very existence of governments in the region. Haiti’s criminal gangs unseated the government in early 2024 and took the country to ransom. And in Ecuador, which was once lauded as one of the safest countries in Latin America, the government is fighting a battle for its survival against gangs who are fast encroaching upon the power of the state.

Gangs have become such a serious problem in Latin America that they are damaging the region’s economic performance. Research by the International Monetary Fund suggests that bringing the crime level in Latin America down to the world average would increase the region’s annual economic growth by 0.5 percentage points – around a third of Latin America’s growth between 2017 and 2019.

Latin America’s criminal gangs have long been a neglected issue. But not anymore. Amid mounting concern about criminal violence and a low level of trust in the police, the governments of some Latin American and Caribbean countries are enacting states of emergency, putting through policies they would normally not be authorised to do, for the safety and protection of their citizens.

Colloquially known as mano dura (Spanish for “firm hand” or “iron fist”), this approach involves suspending the fundamental rights of the citizenry by giving the military and law enforcement agencies the power to arrest, incarcerate and deport anyone found to be involved with criminal gangs. It also denies access to legal measures to establish the arrested person’s right to a fair and open trial.

Sprawling authoritarianism

Mano dura measures were introduced to Latin America in March 2022 by El Salvador’s charismatic albeit controversial president, Nayib Bukele. Following a spike in gang violence that left 87 people dead in a single weekend, Bukele curtailed the right to be informed of the reason for arrest and access to a lawyer upon being detained.

By February 2024, more than 76,000 people – almost 2% of the Salvadoran population — had been detained under the provisions of mano dura. Critics have decried the crackdown as a gross human rights violation. Troops have rounded people up for having tattoos and being in poor neighbourhoods, leading to the detention of thousands of innocent people in overcrowded Salvadorian jails.

Instead of taking measures to prevent abusive arrests, Bukele has publicly backed the security forces. There are also few independent judges in the country after Bukele’s party passed a reform in 2021 that gave the supreme court the power to remove judges and force them into retirement.

Nevertheless, many people in El Salvador have accepted the crackdown with open arms.

Thanks to Bukele’s firm-handed approach to gangs and organised crime, El Salvador has gone from being the murder capital of the world to one of the safest countries in Latin America. In February, basking in soaring approval ratings, Bukele was re-elected as president in a landslide election.

Mano dura politics are fast gaining reception across the region. In late April 2024, Ecuadorians voted in favour of continuing with a state of emergency in a national referendum. This move gives the country’s president, Daniel Noboa, the power to deploy soldiers on the streets to fight “drug-fuelled violence and extradite criminals abroad”.

Citizens of democracies voluntarily demanding authoritarian measures in their structure of governance is rare. The only recent example occurred in 2018 when mass protests swept across Latin America. The protests led more South Americans to see autocratic governance as a necessity for maintaining law and order.

In much the same way, the current widespread support in Latin America for mano dura interventions is a product of two interrelated factors. The suffering population is at a breaking point. And there is a reckoning that only extreme authoritarian measures can address the challenges posed by the gangs.

The capacity of many Latin American states to protect – let alone promote – their foundational values is being compromised by gang violence. Given this backdrop, it is no wonder that fighting fire with fire to curtail the power and influence of criminal gangs is gaining approval.

It is too early to predict if other Latin American states groaning under gang menace will fully replicate the Salvadoran and Ecuadorean model. However, countries with even very low homicide rates like Bolivia, Argentina and Chile have all now adopted some mano dura policies.

The “Bukele model” is gaining approval and will probably become a mainstream policy option in this violent region.