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Many in the Middle East are holding their breath after two attacks on the communications systems of Hezbollah in Lebanon left 37 people dead and thousands injured. Details are still emerging of how these attacks, which involved exploding pagers and walkie talkies, were orchestrated. While Israel has declined to comment on the attacks, it is widely thought to be their operation, and many observers, academics and journalists are predicting they could trigger a wider conflict between Hezbollah and Israel.
Scott Lucas, an expert in Middle East politics has been a regular contributor to our coverage of the conflict in Gaza and its regional implications. Here he addresses several of the key questions.
Assuming the attacks were carried out by Israel, what does this suggest about the government’s thinking?
The immediate context for the attacks is the “low-intensity war” between Israel and Hezbollah since October 7, with the cycle of violence triggered by Hamas’s mass killings inside Israel and then the Israeli military operations killing more than 41,000 people in Gaza.
The skirmishes and exchanges of fire on the Israeli-Lebanese border before these latest attacks were not as publicised as the devastating conflict in Gaza. But they had accounted for the deaths of more than 370 Hezbollah members, at least 130 civilians in Lebanon and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, and 22 Israeli soldiers.
But the wider context stems from the failure of Israel to defeat Hamas after almost a year of operations in Gaza. Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was enduring a rise in criticism, with the demand that he put a priority on the return of hostages over continuing military attacks.
On Monday, the day before the pager attacks, Netanyahu’s government switched attention to Lebanon with the demand that around 60,000 evacuated residents be able to return to their homes in northern Israel. Meanwhile, his office told the Israeli media that defence minister Yoav Gallant might be fired.
Facing the end of his political career and legal jeopardy if he could not fulfil his pledge to “destroy” Hamas, Netanyahu could well be ready to risk an expanded conflict.
Where does this leave Hezbollah and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah?
In uncertainty and at risk of a wider Israeli assault.
The Israeli attacks were in part psychological, demonstrating that nowhere is safe for Hezbollah’s members. They illustrated that Israel will act without concern about civilian casualties.
But they also were preparation for an escalated war upon Hezbollah. Israel had already disrupted the organisation through the vulnerability of its mobile phone communications, leading Nasrallah to ban their use in February and to order the use of pagers. That alternative, as well as walkie-talkies, now may not be possible.
How can Hezbollah’s command-and-control function if Israel steps up aerial assaults or launches a cross-border incursion?
Nasrallah’s response, in a speech on Thursday afternoon, was to declare: “This is a declaration of war.” He reiterated his oft-delivered message that: “The resistance in Lebanon will not stop supporting the resistance in Gaza, the West Bank and all the aggrieved.”
But this boilerplate rhetoric came after Nasrallah’s admission: “We have received a very hard hit.”
While he insisted, “Our infrastructure has not been shaken… It is robust, mighty, coherent,” the Hezbollah leader probably realises that his damaged organisation is outmanned and outgunned in a direct fight with Israel.
That leaves the question: what methods could Hezbollah pursue beyond the limited effect of its rockets to inflict pain on Israel? Or does it, in a battered and fractured, hope that politics and Netanyahu’s internal difficulties finally check its opponent?
Will a war between Israel and Hezbollah inevitably draw Iran into the conflict, and what would that mean for the wider region?
In theory, Hezbollah can count on the backing of Iran’s regime, its essential support since the 1980s. But since October 7, the aggressive rhetoric of Iran’s leadership has been in stark contrast to its caution over any direct confrontation with Israel.
Yes, Iran did carry out “demonstration” missile and drone strikes in April amid Israel’s targeted assassinations of Iranian commanders and officials in Syria. But after those strikes, calibrated to avoid populated areas and signalled to enable all drones and all but nine missiles to be shot down, Tehran stepped back.
When Israel assassinated Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran on July 31, the supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guards pledged retaliation. It never happened.
Facing serious economic problems and given that much of the Iranian public does not want to be embroiled in regional conflict, the Islamic Republic’s leaders now face a tough decision: is it riskier to intervene or to stand aside?
How might these events affect the US election campaign?
Israel-Lebanon does not have the same salience as Israel-Gaza in American political culture. For that reason, I don’t expect many voters, even if they notice this week’s attacks, to have this as a priority consideration for the November 5 election.
I think that only changes if Israel launches a cross-border ground assault, or if Hezbollah kills a significant number of Israeli civilians in rocket strikes.
Scott Lucas does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
