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By M.K.Narayanan/The Hindu
Chennai, October 14: In September this year, the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi visited the United States to attend yet another meeting of the Quad nations (Australia, India, Japan and the U.S.). This turned out to be possibly the most significant meeting of the Quad to date, during which the quartet seemed to firm up what may be viewed as a security alliance.
The ‘Wilmington Declaration’ did not mention any country, least of all China by name, but left nothing to the imagination that it was aimed at the containment of China across the entire Indo-Pacific.
Despite the absence of any reference to a formal mutual defence declaration, it was obvious that the “four maritime democracies” had a single objective, viz., to checkmate China.
The message from the Wilmington Declaration has certain overriding implications for India and India’s security. India-China relations today are not merely stalemated but are also steadily deteriorating. In the northern border regions, the stalemate in the Galwan region continues despite some soothing statements by India’s military and civilian leaders. Recently, India announced that it will maintain, if not increase, its vigilance in the border areas by inducting more forces despite the onset of winter.
In the Depsang Plains and Demchok, there has been no breakthrough in negotiations regarding disengagement. In Ladakh alone, the number of ‘friction points’ has increased, with Indian forces unable to access several ‘patrolling points’ that they were previously accustomed to.
The military is currently in the process of further augmenting its fighting capabilities across the entire length of the China-India border. It is inducting new long-range firearms and heavy artillery, and has begun to deploy howitzers, missiles, rocket systems and ‘loitering munitions’.
While the Indian Army Chief has characterised the current situation along the Line of Actual Control as ‘stable and sensitive’, he has also stated that the Indian armed forces “are operational and fully prepared to deal with any contingency”.
While strengthening its border capabilities, China appears unfazed by India’s moves, confident that given its defence budget (which dwarfs that of India), it can thwart any new Indian initiative.
China’s arrogance, misplaced or otherwise, is legendary. It is again true that China greatly depends on the element of surprise to achieve the best results for itself. Hence, while it may look unfazed at this time by talk by India acquiring ‘new alliance partners’ from the West, China is unlikely to take such a situation lightly.
Dealing with China is never a ‘zero sum game’, and India’s leaders need to be wary and watchful of how China reacts to the developing situation. What is again worrying is that China under Xi Jinping seems increasingly willing in most situations to test the waters vis-à-vis its neighbours, including India.
Aggressive Nationalism
It may, thus, be prudent for India to proceed with care in its dealings with China on the one hand, and with its Quad partners on the other. In the short term, it may be expedient not to be seen to align with countries that have openly declared their hostility to China, for Xi Jinping’s China is almost certain to treat this as a provocation, compelling it to ‘walk the talk’.
In this context, it is worth recalling that as far back as 2017, Mr. Xi had ominously declared that ‘China under Xi was different from China under Deng’. In 2021, the centenary year of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC), Mr. Xi had again made a series of pronouncements which included a stern warning to all external forces “seeking to bully, oppress or subjugate China”.
In 2022, in the course of the 20th National Congress of the CPC, statements made by China’s leaders appeared to reveal an increasingly aggressive brand of Chinese nationalism. Rationality is not something to be expected of China in any situation. India must not overlook this aspect, and should ‘read the tea leaves’ correctly in its dealings with China.
Over the years, India’s strategic experts had sought to differentiate between what in the Chinese mind constitutes a ‘real’ threat as distinct from peripheral dangers that haunt the Chinese psyche. From China’s postures it can be inferred that the border issue with India in the Himalayas does not represent a real threat to China’s sovereignty and to its future. This is notwithstanding that from the early 1950s, China has made territorial claims on several thousand square kilometres of Indian territory, in Ladakh and in Arunachal Pradesh.
China is well aware that its claims here were based on maps that were at best ‘non-official’, created during predecessors’ regimes. China itself tends to doubt their sanctity though it is not willing to give up its claims.
The situation existing as far as China’s eastern seaboard is concerned, as also its claims in the Pacific to its east, fall into an entirely different category. Here, any attempt to tamper with what China believes is its territory, constitutes in its mind a real threat to China’s very existence. Understanding the difference is important as far as the Chinese psyche is concerned.
India’s strategic community has understood this for a long time and has dealt with China’s quirky behaviour in a nuanced manner over the years.
Lately, however, India does seem to have shifted its stance to an extent and it is possible that the Chinese read this as an outcome of India’s growing alignment with the West, specifically with the U.S.
Recent overtures by China, including statements of the Chinese Defence Ministry that China and India have been able to ‘reduce differences and build some consensus’ on disengaging troops from friction points to end the stand-off in eastern Ladakh, and have also agreed to a dialogue to reach a resolution acceptable to both sides, could well signal a shift in China’s approach, but India does not seem to take this seriously.
Beijing’s View
All this serves as a backdrop to China’s increasing concerns over India’s association with the Quad — seen by it as a U.S.-sponsored ‘coalition of the willing’. Rumblings from China have grown stronger of late. To the fevered Chinese mind of today, India’s membership of the Quad represents a far more serious threat to it than the occasional skirmishes on the Himalayan heights.
The Wilmington Declaration, having given up any pretence that the Quad is not a defence alliance, could well be seen by China as an indication of a grand design by the U.S. and its enemies to encircle and contain China. With this, China’s understanding of the threat posed by India will increase significantly.
India must take due care not to send out any wrong signals, as the consequences of this could be serious. Any resort to confrontational politics, in substance and as well as in style, can have adverse repercussions in the India-China context.
History may not repeat itself, but as Mark Twain is reported to have said, “it rhymes” enough to make one uneasy. India must not, and need not, subscribe to Mr. Xi’s notion of a ‘community of shared future of mankind’ (first mentioned almost a decade ago), but India must not also be seen to subscribe to the West’s entrenched belief that China’s rise is inimical to the future of mankind, and that nations across the globe should join together to post a challenge to it.
In the context of China, it would, hence, be prudent for India not to be seen to be increasing its security congruence with the U.S. and the West. Clearly, India has no intention of being part of any pincer movement directed at China and its future ambitions, but it is equally important that China understands this — and the world recognises this as well — and has no reason to doubt where India stands in terms of Asian and world security.
Any impression that India has become part of the U.S. bandwagon, engaged in checkmating China’s ambitions is best avoided. India’s future is hardly dependent on checkmating China’s ambitions or in aiding any U.S. attempts to prevent this from becoming a reality.
M.K. Narayanan is a former Director, Intelligence Bureau, a former National Security Adviser, and a former Governor of West Bengal
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