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As Germany elects its next Bundestag, migration remains one of the most important issues to voters. But politicians are not debating how to attract the 288,000 migrants the country needs every year to maintain its workforce. Rather, parties struggle over who can promise the most deportations and the tightest border controls.
Anti-immigrant sentiment has profoundly reshaped Germany’s political landscape. It is connected to the surge of the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), as well as the rightward shift of the Christian Democrats and Liberals, and the social democrat SPD under current chancellor Olaf Scholz.
Even the Greens and the Left party were internally conflicted on the matter, ultimately leading the anti-immigration BSW to split off from the Left.
One of the most prominent areas of anti-migrant sentiment is social policy. Migrants are depicted as the culprit behind problems with minimum income protection, child benefits, the education system and even dentist appointments.
At the centre of the debate is the notion of “welfare magnetism”. This is the idea that migrants are drawn to Germany by its generous welfare system. Actors like the AfD and Christian Democratic chancellorship-hopeful Friedrich Merz refer to it more pointedly as “Sozialtourismus” – welfare tourism.
Welfare magnetism: what does the evidence say?
For decades, politicians in Germany have suspected welfare as a “pull factor” for migrants, especially those living in poverty. Parties have proposed and implemented the same solution again and again: welfare exclusions. In 2006 and 2016, EU migrant citizens were excluded from two major social assistance schemes for their first five years in Germany.
Aside from normalising anti-immigrant sentiment, this achieved very little. In a major research project on the interplay between migration and social policy that ran from 2019 to 2024, we could find no evidence that introducing these exclusions led to declining migrant numbers.
Generally, most research finds that welfare magnetism is an overstated idea. Analyses of various countries, including Germany, find no evidence of welfare take-up being a significant driver of (large-scale) migration.
Even researchers promoting the idea struggle to produce convincing evidence. Their findings are often limited to hyper-specific scenarios, such as migration between border towns of two US states.
While immigration economist George Borjas claims that “differences in welfare benefits generate strong magnetic effects” he himself calls the empirical evidence “relatively weak”, and notes that “there may well be alternative stories that explain the evidence”.
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In one study, researchers claimed to find “some of the first causal evidence on the welfare magnet hypothesis” in Denmark. Yet they analysed a case in which many of the immigrants in question were also excluded from the labour market and where their belongings were (partially) confiscated upon entering the country.
Under these circumstances, the researchers found that radically cutting welfare benefits by up to 50% could lead asylum seekers – who were migrating either way – to choose a different country of destination. As the researchers point out, “most newly arrived refugees have very limited job opportunities and therefore no alternative to welfare benefits”.
A major driving force of international migration is conflict. If refugees fleeing war are given no alternative option of sustaining a living than receiving benefits – and if these benefits are then cut – the refugees in question may seek asylum elsewhere. This, however, has little to do with a “pull effect” and is a far cry from anything that could be considered welfare tourism.
When confronted with the research, centrist politicians argue that regardless of how big a threat welfare magnetism actually is, people are afraid of it. To beat the far right, politicians feel obliged to copy their arguments.
But research shows this approach does not work. By copying the far right, mainstream parties normalise instead of weakening the fringes. Far-right parties will always be able to make more extreme demands than the mainstream – there is no point in trying to beat them on their own turf.
Policies that link migration and welfare can also make situations in already struggling areas worse. In our forthcoming research, we identified such problems in Germany.
In Nordstadt, a deprived neighbourhood in Dortmund, many migrants face poor living conditions as economic disadvantages overlap with welfare exclusions. Many cannot afford proper housing and healthcare, and have to accept exploitative working conditions.
Social assistance could provide help, yet excluding migrants from federally funded welfare schemes means that municipalities are largely left to deal with these challenges.
Working with the far right
Despite the lack of evidence for welfare tourism, the current political trajectory suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment will thrive further in Germany. Recent acts of violence by asylum seekers, including a fatal stabbing in Aschaffenburg, led the far-right AfD – accompanied by mainstream parties – to immediately push for restrictive immigration policy reforms.
In a watershed moment for German politics, the Christian Democrats subsequently broke with a postwar taboo, voting with the AfD in favour of border closures and similar measures. Merz was harshly criticised for cooperating with the AfD, and his immigration bill ultimately failed.
But, notably, hardly any party openly opposed his anti-immigration positions as such. The dispute was primarily about his cooperation with the AfD and less about disagreement over policy substance.
This was evident in the first televised debate between Scholz and Merz, where competition over who was tougher on migrants took up a significant portion of the run time.
Rarely have German elections seen a list of lead candidates so unequivocally united in characterising migrants as a threat. However, political tides may shift. Some of these candidates will unavoidably lose – and, perhaps, parties will shift gear once in opposition or government responsibility.
Dominic Afscharian has previously received funding from the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs under the FIS research grant. This article has followed from the associated project "Freedom of Movement and Social Policy in Historical and International Comparison (FuS)". He currently works for the Zentrum für neue Sozialpolitik in Berlin, Germany, which was not involved in the genesis of this article.
Martin Seeleib-Kaiser has previously received funding from the German Federal Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs under the FIS research grant. This article has followed from the associated project "Freedom of Movement and Social Policy in Historical and International Comparison (FuS)".
