Lancashire’s Reform UK leader joins body speaking on behalf of local authorities
The Reform UK leader of Lancashire County Council has become the party’s official representative on the body that speaks on behalf of local authorities nationwide. Stephen Atkinson is now leader […]
The Reform UK leader of Lancashire County Council has become the party’s official representative on the body that speaks on behalf of local authorities nationwide.
Stephen Atkinson is now leader of the Reform group on the Local Government Association (LGA) – and also the vice-chair of the overall organisation.
He will be the voice and face of the party within local authority circles at a national level, having become one of 10 Reform county council leaders in England following the party’s success at the local elections in May.
County Cllr Atkinson told the Local Democracy Reporting Service he is “honoured” to have been selected.
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“The fact we have a group is testament to our rapid growth in support, and I look forward to working with our councils and councillors across the country to deliver for their communities,” he added.
The LGA says it “strive[s] to agree a common cross-party position on issues and to speak with one voice on behalf of local government”.
Formerly a Conservative until defecting in March, he had been the Tory leader of Ribble Valley Borough Council since 2019, but had already announced his decision to step down from that position before switching sides. He then stood for election to County Hall in the Ribble Valley South West seat, which he snatched from the Conservatives.
Within Lancashire, County Cllr Atkinson has been a strong opponent both of a directly-elected mayor and also local government reorganisation – the process of scrapping of Lancashire’s 15 main councils, including the county council, and replacing them with a handful of new authorities.
He has pushed for referendums on the two issues – both of which have become flagship policies of the Labour government.
Ministers have said any public vote on reorganisation would not be binding, white they are remaining tight-lipped about the the arrangements for a mayor of Lancashire until the 15 local leaders submit a plan for “deeper” devolution this autumn.
In a statement on the LGA website, County Cllr Atkinson says: “I’m an experienced leader with a strong foundation in financial literacy, sales strategy, and corporate governance. Over the years, I’ve developed expertise in product development and marketing strategy, always guided by a firm commitment to fiscal responsibility. My approach is grounded in effective communication and negotiation, which I’ve found essential in both leadership and collaborative roles.
“Strategic planning and high-level decision-making have been central to my work, along with a deep understanding of corporate social responsibility and the importance of regulatory compliance. I’m passionate about developing talent and empowering teams through effective delegation. My goal is to apply my commercial insight and leadership experience to support strategic growth, particularly within senior roles in government or public service.”
<p><img width="150" height="150" src="https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SupremeCourt1-1-scaled-e1728423240768-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="Court likely to let Biden’s “ghost gun” regulation stand" title="Court likely to let Biden’s “ghost gun” regulation stand" style="float:right;" decoding="async" srcset="https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SupremeCourt1-1-scaled-e1728423240768-150x150.jpg 150w, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SupremeCourt1-1-scaled-e1728423240768-570x570.jpg 570w, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SupremeCourt1-1-scaled-e1728423240768-500x500.jpg 500w, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/10/SupremeCourt1-1-scaled-e1728423240768-1000x1000.jpg 1000w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" />The Supreme Court on Tuesday appeared ready to uphold a 2022 federal rule regulating so-called “ghost guns” – untraceable weapons without serial numbers, assembled from components or kits that can be bought online. Defending the rule, U.S. Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar described an “explosion in...</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2024/10/court-likely-to-let-bidens-ghost-gun-regulation-stand/">Court likely to let Biden’s “ghost gun” regulation stand</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.</p>
<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/-Bnf1EuwFsW8GwYz9Llg6Hn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="Will the court overturn a 1930s precedent to expand presidential power, again?" title="Will the court overturn a 1930s precedent to expand presidential power, again?"> <img width="150" height="150" src="https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/supremecourt-10-150x150.jpg" class="attachment-thumbnail size-thumbnail wp-post-image" alt="Will the court overturn a 1930s precedent to expand presidential power, again?" title="Will the court overturn a 1930s precedent to expand presidential power, again?" style="float:right;" decoding="async" srcset="https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/supremecourt-10-150x150.jpg 150w, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/supremecourt-10-570x570.jpg 570w, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/supremecourt-10-500x500.jpg 500w, https://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/04/supremecourt-10-1000x1000.jpg 1000w" sizes="(max-width: 150px) 100vw, 150px" /><p><a class="a2a_button_facebook" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/facebook?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotusblog.com%2F2025%2F04%2Fwill-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again%2F&linkname=Will%20the%20court%20overturn%20a%201930s%20precedent%20to%20expand%20presidential%20power%2C%20again%3F" title="Facebook" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_linkedin" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/linkedin?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotusblog.com%2F2025%2F04%2Fwill-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again%2F&linkname=Will%20the%20court%20overturn%20a%201930s%20precedent%20to%20expand%20presidential%20power%2C%20again%3F" title="LinkedIn" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_twitter" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/twitter?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotusblog.com%2F2025%2F04%2Fwill-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again%2F&linkname=Will%20the%20court%20overturn%20a%201930s%20precedent%20to%20expand%20presidential%20power%2C%20again%3F" title="Twitter" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_email" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/email?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotusblog.com%2F2025%2F04%2Fwill-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again%2F&linkname=Will%20the%20court%20overturn%20a%201930s%20precedent%20to%20expand%20presidential%20power%2C%20again%3F" title="Email" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_button_printfriendly" href="https://www.addtoany.com/add_to/printfriendly?linkurl=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotusblog.com%2F2025%2F04%2Fwill-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again%2F&linkname=Will%20the%20court%20overturn%20a%201930s%20precedent%20to%20expand%20presidential%20power%2C%20again%3F" title="PrintFriendly" rel="nofollow noopener" target="_blank"></a><a class="a2a_dd addtoany_no_icon addtoany_share_save addtoany_share" href="https://www.addtoany.com/share#url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.scotusblog.com%2F2025%2F04%2Fwill-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again%2F&title=Will%20the%20court%20overturn%20a%201930s%20precedent%20to%20expand%20presidential%20power%2C%20again%3F" data-a2a-url="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/04/will-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again/" data-a2a-title="Will the court overturn a 1930s precedent to expand presidential power, again?">Share</a></p><p>In the two-and-a-half months since Donald Trump’s inauguration, a rush of challenges to executive orders and directives have made their way through the courts and have now started to reach the justices in earnest. Alongside those orders, Trump fired the heads of several independent government agencies, experts who oversee technical matters of government including the enforcement of antitrust laws and review of federal workers’ challenges to their dismissals. Although the president can remove most government officials for any reason, those positions are protected by Congress from firing without good cause, such as “malfeasance in office,” and by a 1935 Supreme Court case that upheld such for-cause limits.</p>
<p>But some conservative legal scholars, and the president, have embraced a much broader view of executive power, one in which the president has complete authority to fire agency heads. The administration has indicated that it will ask the Supreme Court to overturn a 1935 decision, <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/295/602/"><em>Humphrey’s Executor v. United States</em></a><em>, </em>which would allow the president to do just that<em>. </em>In that decision, the court barred Franklin Delano Roosevelt from firing a Republican member of the Federal Trade Commission. The decision protects the heads of independent, multimember agencies from unjustified removal to allow the agencies to function without the threat of political retaliation.<span id="more-319731"></span></p>
<p>On Monday, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ordered the Trump administration to reinstate Cathy Harris, of the Merit Systems Protection Board, and Gwynne Wilcox, of the National Labor Relations Board. Harris and Wilcox were fired in February and argue that they were illegally removed without the cause that the law requires. The federal government appealed to the Supreme Court on Wednesday, and just hours later Chief Justice John Roberts put both reinstatements on hold while the court considers the request.</p>
<p>I spoke recently with Stephen Vladeck, a professor at Georgetown University Law Center and close observer of the recent rise of the court’s emergency docket. His book on the subject is called <em>The Shadow Docket.</em> We discussed how likely the current court is to overrule <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> and what might stand in its way, even as the majority has embraced an expansive view of executive power.<em> </em></p>
<p><em>Our conversation was conducted by phone and email and has been edited for clarity. </em></p>
<p><strong>Back in February, then-Acting Solicitor General Sarah Harris wrote in a letter to Congress that the Trump administration planned to challenge <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em>, is there a history of presidents ignoring or pushing that precedent since the 1930s?</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>The short answer is no. Obviously opposition to <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> has become something of a cause célèbre especially among conservative judges and scholars, but this is the first time I think we’ve seen the justice department specifically take the position not just that it’s wrong, but that it should be overruled.</p>
<p><strong>What about FDR, where does the case come out of? </strong></p>
<p>FDR took the position that, under the Supreme Court’s <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/52/">1926 ruling in <em>Myers</em></a>, he had the unencumbered power to remove anyone on the Federal Trade Commission and the Supreme Court said he was wrong. The Supreme Court in <em>Humphrey’s Executor </em>unanimously upheld the for-cause removal limitations that Congress had written into the FTC act.</p>
<p>So at least since 1935, presidents of both parties have labored under the assumption that that’s at least good law, whether or not it’s rightly decided, and so have not attempted to remove members of the FTC or the NLRB, or perhaps even more importantly the Federal Reserve, without at least some argument that they met the relevant statutory requirements of good cause.</p>
<p><strong>Was there any analogous protection for that relationship between Congress and the executive before the New Deal era</strong><strong> </strong></p>
<p>Congress had started putting in for-clause removal restrictions long before FDR came along. I think it was just that FDR was, if not the first president, certainly the most vocal president about the scope of a president’s constitutional removal powers. In some respects, I think it was the Supreme Court that changed things when it handed down <em>Myers.</em> Because there’s language in Chief Justice Taft’s majority opinion in <em>Myers</em> that for the first time opened the door to arguments that for-cause removal restrictions were generally unconstitutional. So if we’re building the chronology, the restrictions existed, and then <em>Myers</em> comes along and suggests, perhaps inartfully, that all of them might be unconstitutional. And then <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> was basically the test case for that proposition.</p>
<p><strong>Interesting that Taft was the one that comes under.</strong></p>
<p>There’s a profound historical irony in the fact that it’s the only president to ever serve on the court who’s in a position in <em>Myers</em> to endorse a very very broad and indefeasible presidential removal power.</p>
<p><strong>So back to where <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> sits today, how narrow are those protections?</strong></p>
<p>One of the tricky things about <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> is that, even though the Supreme Court hasn’t overruled it, it has to at least some degree reconceptualized it. <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> itself, if you read Justice Sutherland’s opinion, spends a lot of time talking about how what the FTC does is not purely executive power. Instead, he talks about the quasi-judicial role that the FTC plays and even in some respects, the quasi-legislative role that the FTC plays.</p>
<p>Even though the modern court has not overruled <em>Humphrey’s</em> <em>Executor,</em> it has really, I think, heavily watered down that understanding. Indeed, it has increasingly come to treat <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> as this extreme outlier — as one of two Supreme Court precedents that are at least superficially inconsistent with the broad view of the unitary executive toward which the court has otherwise gravitated, <em><a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/487/654/">Morrison v. Olson</a> </em>being the other.</p>
<p>So the Supreme Court today basically takes the view that there’s <em>Morrison, </em>there’s <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> and there’s nothing else. And that was the basis for the court’s <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/seila-law-llc-v-consumer-financial-protection-bureau/">2020 ruling in <em>Seila Law</em></a> that Congress could not insulate the head of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau from presidential removal because, unlike the head of these multi-member commissions, the head of the CFPB is a single person.</p>
<p>In a world in which we were being faithful to the analysis of <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> and not just the result, it shouldn’t make a difference whether the head was a single person or a multimember board; all that would matter is the type of power that the agency was wielding. But in a world in which <em>Humphrey’s Executor </em>and<em> Morrison </em>are nothing more than exceptions to the rule, then all of the litigation tends to reduce to whether the agency structure at issue is just like the exceptions or not.</p>
<p><strong>You mentioned the Fed before, where does the Fed stand?</strong></p>
<p>Part of why I believe that even this court has been reluctant to overrule <em>Humphrey’s Executor,</em> and it’s had chances, is because I think there is an unspoken but widely shared view that the independence of the Fed (and no other agency) is really important. I don’t think the court has yet been provided with a coherent rationale for a way in which it could overrule <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> without also undermining the independence of the Fed, and thereby risking yet further harm to the stability of our economic system.</p>
<p>Of course, these cases are not just about the FTC and the Fed — there are a bunch of multimember-headed agencies, the SEC, the FCC, the Merit Systems Protection Board, etc., that are implicated by <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em>. But I think the real 800-pound gorilla is the Fed. Maybe it’s enough to just assert that the Fed is different, but at least to this point, there’s been no persuasive explanation for why, legally, that’s so.</p>
<p><strong>But given how the court has handled what’s come to them so far from the Trump administration, is the field wide open for them to take on <em>Humphrey’s</em> <em>Executor</em>? </strong></p>
<p>I think two things can be true. One, I think the court would rather not have to decide one way or the other. And two, I think the Wilcox and Harris cases were always going to force the court to take up the question.</p>
<p><strong>Do you have a sense of where the justices stand individually on this?</strong></p>
<p>I don’t doubt that there are more than two votes to overrule <em>Humphrey’s Executor. </em>But, to me, the most important data point here is that the court has thus far resisted invitations to do so. And if the court were in a hurry to overrule <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em>, I think it would have already.<em> </em></p>
<p>Maybe that was just because it didn’t have to face the issue; maybe there are five or more votes on the merits. But if the theory is correct that at least some of the justices’ reticence is because they don’t want to undermine the independence of the Fed, at least so far, no one has been able to square that circle.</p>
<p><strong>On Wednesday, the chief justice moved very quickly to pause the district court’s orders that had reinstated Harris and Wilcox, just hours after the administration appealed to the court. Does that tell us anything? What do you have your eye on for what happens next?</strong></p>
<p>I think it tells us two things — first, that the chief justice may have been a bit exasperated by the ping-pong nature of the proceedings in the lower courts, where Harris and Wilcox were fired, then not fired, then fired, then not fired again. And second, it strongly suggests to me that the court <em>is</em> going to use these cases to resolve the <em>Humphrey’s Executor</em> question — perhaps not by answering it through the Trump administration’s emergency application, but by taking up the government’s request that it treat the application as a petition for certiorari before judgment, and take up these cases for plenary review on an expedited basis now. If nothing else, it seems increasingly likely that the fate of <em>Humphrey’s Executor </em>will be resolved before the justices rise for their summer recess.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/04/will-the-court-overturn-a-1930s-precedent-to-expand-presidential-power-again/">Will the court overturn a 1930s precedent to expand presidential power, again?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.</p>