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European doubts about deterrence predate the current US administration. Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and its growing reliance on nuclear coercion to ward off Nato support, brought the importance of nuclear weapons to the foreground again for the first time since the cold war.
Even after the invasion, the US continued to prioritise the Indo-Pacific. It questioned the sufficiency of its nuclear arsenal as China’s weapon stockpile grew and delivery systems improved.
A bipartisan US congressional commission concluded that the Chinese and Russian arsenals should be seen as a joint “two-nuclear-peer” problem, with North Korea an additional disrupting presence.
Within this context, European leaders are floating alternatives for deterrence in Europe. The French president, Emmanuel Macron, has again affirmed that the French nuclear deterrent has a “European dimension”.
The Polish president, Andrzej Duda, registered his interest in the idea of the French deterrent being extended to include its European allies. But he also signalled that his country might want to develop its own deterrent.
The incoming German chancellor, Friedrich Merz, has also noted the need to engage with the French and British deterrents. So, could French and British nuclear weapons be enough to deter Russia and reassure European allies?
Russia has roughly as many weapons as the US. Its arsenal comprises approximately 1,700 deployed strategic weapons and 1,000-2,000 other lower-yield, “smaller” so-called “tactical” nuclear weapons, and another 2,500 non-deployed weapons.
This is vastly more than France and the UK which have 290 and 225 respectively, or 515 in total.
Yet, with those numbers both European states should have sufficient strategic weapons to cause unacceptable damage to Moscow and St Petersburg. Their weapons are carried by constantly patrolling nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines – which, are concealed in the ocean far away and are therefore highly likely to survive a first-strike attack. These weapons should be considered credible deterrents for existential threats to either France or the UK.
Unlike the US, France and the UK are in Europe and cannot consider their security distinct from each other or from Europe. The US, meanwhile, had to have a large and flexible arsenal with tactical nuclear weapons, and a large conventional presence in Europe simply to mount a credible argument, not least to its European allies, that it would actually protect Europe, with nuclear weapons as a last resort.
The importance of needing to convince Russia of how serious Nato is about deterrence is a matter of record. When they met in Paris in June 1961, the then French leader, General Charles de Gaulle, expressed doubts to the then US president, John F. Kennedy, as to how serious the US was about its defence of Europe, particularly given the uncertainty at the time of the future security of Berlin.
De Gaulle asked asked Kennedy: “Would you trade New York for Paris?”. His point was that if he wasn’t convinced, would the Russians be? So it’s not just about numbers of warheads. It’s about the defensive posture overall.
Likely scenarios
The issue is not existential deterrence but scenarios where French and British survival are not directly threatened. Neither has the option to escalate with so-called “tactical” (or non-strategic) weapons when non-vital interests are at risk – though France could fire a Rafale-launched nuclear “warning shot”.
Meanwhile, Russia has 1,000–2,000 “tactical” nuclear weapons, which, despite the misleading term, are still entirely capable of levelling a city.
In case of a conflict in Europe, these could provide military and signalling options between doing nothing and catastrophic escalation. Rather than a full-scale invasion, Russia is more likely to test Nato’s unity by pressuring a Baltic state and using nuclear threats to deter any Nato allies intervening in support. France and the UK would struggle to credibly threaten use of strategic weapons in response.
Europe’s solution may lie in advanced conventional weapons to deter Russian aggression by building the ability to raise the costs in early stages of a conflict through what is called a strategy of denial. Such capabilities include long-range precision strikes, fifth generation airpower – such as the American F-35 fighter and the French, German and UK alternatives presently being developed – and integrated air and missile defence.
Given the poor performance of Russia’s own air and missile defence in Ukraine, they could target Russian military units attacking or operating within Nato territory, their reinforcements and their logistics, while denying Russia’s use of missiles. Europe is already investing in cruise missiles, as well as developing their own European long-range strike approach and missile defence.
Through precision, stealth and low-altitude flight, these weapons could also threaten strategic targets deep in Russia – potentially a more viable, less destabilising alternative to expanding French and British nuclear arsenals, or adding a third nuclear power in Europe.
No time to waste
Politically, however, there is a need for more than hardware. European states should find an institutional forum to coordinate deterrence. This means either convincing France to return to Nato’s nuclear planning group or creating another council for European deterrence with France, the UK, and other key European states like Germany and Poland.
Those and other European armed forces could also conduct conventional operations in support of nuclear operations exercises together with France and the UK, specifically the French air force with its air-launched warheads.
Simply put, there are material and political solutions to European deterrence problems if the US turns out to be preoccupied by events in Asia. The real constraint that France and the UK, and the rest of Europe, now face is how to build both the hardware and habits of conventional and nuclear deterrence in Europe in little or no time at all.
Paul van Hooft received a Stanton Nuclear Security Foundation research grant in 2018.
