Category: Politics

Politics

France grapples with surging tropical diseases amid spread of tiger mosquitoes

French regions are waging war against tiger mosquitoes as the country records rising cases of tropical diseases such as dengue, zika and chikungunya. Since Jan.…

mingooland · May 23, 2025 · 2 min read

Politics

Minister Rubbishes Tory Claims That Chagos Deal Will Cost £30bn With 1 Key Point

Luke Pollard hit back at Tory claims about the cost of the Chagos deal. Luke Pollard tore into the Conservative claims that the government’s Chagos…

mingooland · May 23, 2025 · 3 min read

Politics

Supreme Court allows Trump to remove agency heads without cause for now

<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/s8roda5LFkYga3yriwnKmHn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="Supreme Court allows Trump to remove agency heads without cause for now" title="Supreme Court allows Trump to remove agency heads without cause for now"> The Supreme Court on Thursday granted the Trump administration’s request to pause orders by federal judges that required government officials to allow board members at two independent federal agencies to stay in office after President Donald Trump tried to fire them. Chief Justice John Roberts had already issued an administrative stay, which temporarily put those orders on hold to give the justices time to consider the government’s request, so Thursday’s order extends that hold while the litigation continues in a federal appeals court and, if necessary, the Supreme Court. In <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a966_1b8e.pdf">an unsigned two-page order</a>, the court explained that the decision to put the lower courts’ orders on hold “reflects our judgment that the Government faces greater risk of harm from an order allowing a removed officer to continue exercising the executive power than a wrongfully removed officer faces from being unable to perform her statutory duty.” Justice Elena Kagan dissented from the court’s order, in an eight-page opinion joined by Justices Sonia Sotomayor and Ketanji Brown Jackson. Calling the order “nothing short of extraordinary,” Kagan would have turned down the Trump administration’s request. The dispute stems from Trump’s efforts to remove two federal officials, Gwynne Wilcox of the National Labor Relations Board and Cathy Harris of the Merits Systems Protection Board, earlier this year. Both women were appointed by then-President Joe Biden for terms that were due to expire in 2028. Wilcox and Harris went to federal court in Washington, D.C., where they argued that their firings violated federal law because, unlike most federal officials, they can only be removed for good cause. Two different federal judges ruled for the officials, ordering the Trump administration to allow them to continue to serve. A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit blocked those orders, but the full court of appeals reversed that ruling and reinstated the trial judges’ instructions to allow Wilcox and Harris to remain in office. The Trump administration came to the Supreme Court on April 9, asking the justices to put the orders on hold or, in the alternative, take up the dispute and rule on the merits of the cases, without waiting for the court of appeals to weigh in. Trump’s solicitor general, D. John Sauer, contended that the dispute implicates an important constitutional question: the president’s ability to supervise the agency heads who exercise power on his behalf. Sauer argued that Trump’s power to fire Wilcox and Harris is not limited by Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, a 1935 Supreme Court case holding that although a president can typically fire subordinates for any reason, Congress can create independent, multi-member regulatory agencies whose commissioners can only be removed for cause. That case, Sauer said, merely recognized a narrow exception to the president’s removal power that applies only to multimember expert agencies that (unlike the MSPB and the NLRB) do not have substantial executive power. Harris urged the justices not to intervene. Under Humphrey’s Executor, she emphasized, the MSPB’s structure is clearly constitutional, because the board is “predominantly an adjudicatory body” that “merely hears discrete cases regarding civil servants, and neutrally applies laws Congress passed prohibiting arbitrary dismissal, discrimination, and retaliation.” Harris cautioned that if the court were to conclude that the MSPB’s structure is not constitutional, then “nothing is” – including, crucially, the Federal Reserve. Wilcox echoed Harris’s warnings about the potential implications of overruling Humphrey’s Executor. She added that the Supreme Court has allowed the law governing the structure of the NLRB to stand for nearly a century. And during that time, she stressed, 14 different presidents have not challenged it. “No real-world harm will come from allowing the ordinary appellate process to unfold over a few more months,” Wilcox wrote. Less than a week after the D.C. Circuit heard oral arguments in the dispute, the court issued its unsigned opinion. The majority observed that although it would not ultimately decide the issue, the “Government is likely to show that both the NLRB and MSPB exercise considerable executive power.” The majority also rejected Harris’s suggestion that a ruling for the government could threaten the structure of the Federal Reserve. The Fed, it wrote, “is a uniquely structured, quasi-private entity that follows in the distinct historical tradition of the First and Second Banks of the United States.” In her dissent, Kagan emphasized that Humphrey’s Executor “undergirds a significant feature of American governance: bipartisan administrative bodies carrying out expertise-based functions with a measure of independence from presidential control.” Because it “remains good law,” it also, she wrote, “forecloses both the President’s firings” of Harris and Wilcox and the majority’s “decision to award emergency relief.” Kagan contended that “the order allows the President to overrule Humphrey’s by fiat, again pending our eventual review.” Kagan complained that the majority’s order “favors the President over our precedent; and it does so unrestrained by the rules of briefing and argument—and the passage of time—needed to discipline our decision-making.” The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/05/supreme-court-allows-trump-to-remove-agency-heads-without-cause-for-now/">Supreme Court allows Trump to remove agency heads without cause for now</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.

mingooland · May 23, 2025 · 5 min read

Politics

From police powers to pork: Supreme Court faces broad range of new relists

<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/2QEiaHJakWZinV0hmZTFmHn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="From police powers to pork: Supreme Court faces broad range of new relists" title="From police powers to pork: Supreme Court faces broad range of new relists"> The Relist Watch column examines cert petitions that the Supreme Court has “relisted” for its upcoming conference. A short explanation of relists is available <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/faqs-announcements-of-orders-and-opinions/#relists_explained">here</a>. There are 102 petitions and applications on the Supreme Court’s docket for this week’s conference. After several months of relisting cases at a slow rate, the court has picked up the pace: There are six newly relisted cases this week covering a wide range of subjects. Another commerce clause challenge to California’s Proposition 12 For the second time in as many years, the Supreme Court is once again considering a challenge to California’s Proposition 12, a voter-approved measure banning the in-state sale of pork from pigs confined in ways deemed cruel, such as cages denying them at least 24 square feet of space or the ability to turn around. In <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/iowa-pork-producers-association-v-bonta/">Iowa Pork Producers Association v. Bonta</a>, pork producers argue that Proposition 12 violates the dormant commerce clause by discriminating against out-of-state pork producers, who they say had less “lead time” to comply than California farmers subject to an earlier law, Proposition 2. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit dismissed the complaint, finding no plausible discrimination claim and ruling that the pork producers’ claim that the law imposed excessive burdens on interstate commerce under the balancing test of the 1970 case <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/397/137/">Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.</a> (which considers whether the effects on interstsate commerce are merely incidental) was foreclosed by the court’s fractured 2023 decision in <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/national-pork-producers-council-v-ross/">National Pork Producers Council v. Ross</a>. That decision upheld Proposition 12 against a similar challenge to the current one, with a majority of the court rejecting an argument that the California law impermissibly had an extraterritorial effect on other states; five justices rejected a similar Pike claim, though in separate opinions and based on different rationales. That said, lower courts have had trouble determining what Ross’s governing rule is under <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/430/188/">Marks v. United States</a>, the court’s leading precedent on how to interpret fractured holdings, which held that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds.” Iowa Pork Producers now seek review, arguing that their discrimination claim distinguishes this case from Ross and that the 9th Circuit misread Ross’s holding under Marks. The petition also raises due process, privileges and immunities, and preemption claims, though those are secondary to the dormant commerce clause challenge. California and several animal welfare groups that joined the case to defend the law counter that the discrimination claim is implausible, the Pike issue is settled by Ross, and the additional claims are not properly before the court. What’s got the court’s attention? The discrimination angle is the likely hook — Iowa Pork Producers insist that Proposition 12’s lead-time disparity gave California farmers a protectionist edge over those from other states. The 9th Circuit’s quick dismissal at the pleading stage might tempt the court to clarify whether such allegations deserve a fuller airing, especially given the dormant commerce clause’s core anti-discrimination principle between states. But the Pikeclaim, tied to Ross’s messy split, is a tougher sell; the court may hesitate to revisit that issue so soon, especially with no clear circuit split. The Marks issue — how to parse fractured rulings — adds some academic intrigue. People have wondered for years whether dissenting votes count towards the “holding” on an issue; here’s a <a href="https://volokh.com/2012/07/02/what-did-the-court-hold-about-the-commerce-clause-and-medicaid/">blog post</a> I wrote on the subject back in 2012. Given Ross’s relatively fresh vintage and the court’s reluctance to referee state morality-based legislation, this petition faces an uphill climb. For now, the pork industry — and SCOTUS watchers — will have to wait to see if <a href="https://m.media-amazon.com/images/I/51ksYVTbvGL._AC_UF894,1000_QL80_.jpg">this piggie goes to market or cries wee-wee-wee all the way home</a>. Mootness and election law challenges Voters supporting Buffalo Mayor <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Byron_Brown">Byron Brown</a>’s 2021 independent candidacy challenged New York’s <a href="https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/laws/ELN/6-158">early filing deadline for independent candidate petitions</a>, which moved the deadline from August to May, preventing Brown’s name from appearing on the ballot after his Democratic primary loss. Incredibly, Brown won the mayoralty anyway as a write-in candidate, but later resigned to become CEO of a gambling firm. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit dismissed the challengers’ lawsuit as moot – that is, no longer a live controversy – after the election, concluding that the voters were required to make specific allegations that they would support a similar late-arising independent candidate in future elections. In <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/meadors-v-erie-county-board-of-elections/">Meadors v. Erie County Board of Elections</a>, the challengers – represented by the University of Virginia’s Supreme Court Clinic – argue that the case comes within the exception for matters that are “capable of repetition yet evading review.” They contend the 2nd Circuit’s decision conflicts with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 8th Circuit’s flexible approach, which presumes that recurrence is possible if the law still exists, and contravenes <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/460/780/">Supreme Court precedent</a>. The board of elections, while agreeing that the case isn’t moot (and characterizing the alleged split as “a slight difference of interpretation among the circuits”), now urges the court to deny review, citing the unpublished decision’s lack of precedential value, an alleged lack of voter injury, and it argues that the voters would likely lose if the court gets to the merits. The breadth of the “compassionate release” statute Two cases involve the scope of judicial discretion under the co-called “compassionate release statute,” <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3582">18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)</a>, which permits a sentence reduction if the defendant requests it and the sentencing judge finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Joe Fernandez, serving a mandatory life sentence for the murder for hire of two Mexican drug cartel members, won a sentence reduction based on the district judge’s doubts about Fernandez’s guilt — stemming from the shakiness of a key witness’s testimony — and stark sentencing disparities with co-defendants who received sentences of two to 30 years. The 2nd Circuit reversed, holding that potential innocence claims must be made in petitions for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, not through compassionate release claims, and that Fernandez’s disparity wasn’t “extraordinary and compelling” given his co-defendants’ plea deals. In <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/fernandez-v-united-states/">Fernandez v. United States</a>, Fernandez argues the 2nd Circuit’s holding conflicts with the broader view of judicial discretion adopted by the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 1st and 9th Circuits, as well as with Supreme Court precedents cautioning against placing extra-textual limits on factors judges can consider at sentencing. Similarly, Joel Elliott, serving a 444-month sentence for arson and a Section 924(c) firearm offense, sought a sentence reduction, arguing that his conviction wouldn’t qualify for a significant sentencing enhancement as a “crime of violence” under current law, and he also pointed to both the unusual severity of his sentence and to his rehabilitation. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit denied him relief, concluding that circuit precedent foreclosed his claim. That court, like the 2nd Circuit in Fernandez, held that Elliott’s challenge to his Section 924(c) conviction was a “§ 2255-like” claim barred from consideration as an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for release. Elliott’s petition, in <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/elliott-v-united-states/">Elliott v. United States</a>, alleges the same circuit split as in Fernandez. In both cases, the government insists any circuit split is overstated. Moreover, it notes that the U.S. Sentencing Commission has since amended the Sentencing Guidelines to expand the list of considerations that will support reductions, but even as amended does not permit reductions based on the factors cited by Fernandez and Elliott. It remains to be seen whether the justices will conclude that the Guidelines’ amendments moot this dispute, or whether the statute permits broader relief. Compassionate release watchers are holding their breath. New “factual predicates” and habeas claims Kayla Ayers was convicted of aggravated arson after a mattress caught fire in her father’s basement. At trial, Ohio’s fire inspector testified the blaze had two ignition points — suggesting intentional arson — and Ayers’s court-appointed lawyer never challenged his credentials or hired a competing expert. Years later, just before her release, Ayers obtained an expert report that declared the inspector’s methods “unscientific,” his logic “circular,” and his testimony “complete bunk.” Ayers then filed a federal habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Usually, a person in state custody has one year from the date on which the judgment became final to file a habeas petition, but the one-year clock restarts when a previously undiscoverable “factual predicate” “could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” The question here: Did that expert report restart the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act one-year limitations clock under Section 2244(d)(1)(D) as a newly discovered “factual predicate”? The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit said yes, reasoning that the expert’s report provided the “vital facts” necessary to satisfy the <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/466/668/#:~:text=Washington%2C%20466%20U.S.%20668%20(1984)&text=The%20appropriate%20standard%20for%20ineffective,led%20to%20a%20different%20outcome.">Strickland v. Washington</a> ineffectiveness standard and that Ayers couldn’t reasonably have discovered those facts earlier. In <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/chambers-smith-v-ayers/">Chambers-Smith v. Ayers</a>, Ohio asks the justices to weigh in, arguing that eight circuits reject such expansive interpretations of Section 2244(d)(1)(D) and that allowing any “new support” of a known claim to restart the habeas clock effectively obliterates AEDPA’s time bar. Ayers denies that there’s a circuit split and says that this case just involves a fact-bound application of settled law. She also argues that the petition is jurisdictionally out of time, because the state did not file within 90 days after the 6th Circuit’s judgment — because that day fell on a weekend, it wound up filing on the 91st day. The state counters that due dates are automatically extended when the last day falls over a weekend. And it insists that the 6th Circuit’s approach diverges from cases from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, and 5th Circuits that treat new expert opinions as supporting evidence, not a new predicate. Warrantless entry to prevent a suicide Trevor Case’s ex-girlfriend called police saying he had threatened suicide and might have a gun. Police officers entered his home without a warrant nearly 40 minutes later, even though they suspected Case might be attempting “suicide by cop.” Officers shot Case during the resulting chaos, and Case was charged and convicted of assaulting an officer. Case argued that the officer’s warrantless entry into his house violated the Fourth Amendment, so that the gun and other evidence should be suppressed. The Montana Supreme Court affirmed the denial of his motion to suppress in a 4–3 decision, adopting a standard that requires police have an “objectively reasonable belief” that there is an emergency before providing assistance — something substantially less than a showing of probable cause. In <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/case-v-montana/">Case v. Montana</a>, Case argues that this “reasonable belief” standard improperly dilutes <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/547/398/">Brigham City v. Stuart</a>, in which the court held that police may enter a home without a warrant when they have an “objectively reasonable” basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or imminently threatened with such injury. And he argues that the holding below conflicts with holdings from the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 2nd, 11th, and District of Columbia Circuits, which require probable cause for warrantless home entry even under emergency-aid rationales. In a supporting brief, the Project for Privacy and Surveillance Accountability urge the Supreme Court to step in, warning that loosening the evidentiary standard here could greenlight broader incursions into digital and home privacy alike. Montana argues that the “objectively reasonable basis” test amounts to probable cause in practice, and that the split is more semantic than substantive. The court has not considered the circumstances when police may enter a home since 2021’s <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/20pdf/20-157_8mjp.pdf">Caniglia v. Strom</a>, when Justice Brett Kavanaugh wrote separately to explain his belief that “police officers may enter a home without a warrant in circumstances where they are reasonably trying to prevent a potential suicide.” So the court has a lot to chew on at this week’s conference. Tune in Monday to find out whether they’ll be adding to the fall argument calendar. New Relists <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/fernandez-v-united-states/">Fernandez v. United States</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-556.html">24-556</a> Issue: Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit erred in recognizing extra-textual limitations on what information a court may consider when determining whether there exist extraordinary and compelling reasons warranting a sentence reduction under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3582">18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)</a>. (relisted after the May 15 conference.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/chambers-smith-v-ayers/">Chambers-Smith v. Ayers</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-584.html">24-584</a> Issue: Whether, when a person in state custody obtains new support for a previously available claim, that means she has a new “factual predicate” that restarts her clock to file a habeas petition under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2244">28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(1)(D)</a>. (relisted after the May 15 conference.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/case-v-montana/">Case v. Montana</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-624.html">24-624</a> Issue: Whether law enforcement may enter a home without a search warrant based on less than probable cause that an emergency is occurring, or whether the emergency-aid exception requires probable cause. (relisted after the May 15 conference.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/meadors-v-erie-county-board-of-elections/">Meadors v. Erie County Board of Elections</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-684.html">24-684</a> Issue: Whether the “capable of repetition, yet evading review” doctrine requires plaintiffs in election law cases to predict and articulate specific plans for their own future electoral participation, or instead it is sufficient to show that the challenged law will continue to affect voters and candidates in future elections. (relisted after the May 15 conference.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/iowa-pork-producers-association-v-bonta/">Iowa Pork Producers Association v. Bonta</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-728.html">24-728</a> Issues: (1) Whether a party alleging that California’s Proposition 12, “which enacts a pork sales ban to regulate the manner in which pigs are housed in states across the country,” discriminates against interstate commerce, both directly and under <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/397/137/">Pike v. Bruce Church</a>, states a claim; and (2) whether lower federal courts evaluating fractured opinions from this court consider all justices’ opinions to determine the majority position on a legal issue, or instead are limited to consider only opinions concurring in the result. (relisted after the May 15 conference.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/elliott-v-united-states/">Elliott v. United States</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-6126.html">24-6126</a> Issue: Whether a combination of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that may warrant a discretionary sentence reduction under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/18/3582">18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)</a> can include reasons that may also be alleged as grounds for vacatur of a sentence under <a href="https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/28/2255">28 U.S.C. § 2255</a>. (relisted after the May 15 conference.) Returning Relists <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/apache-stronghold-v-united-states/">Apache Stronghold v. United States</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-291.html">24-291</a> Issue: Whether the government “substantially burdens” religious exercise under the <a href="https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/jmd/legacy/2014/07/24/act-pl103-141.pdf">Religious Freedom Restoration Act</a>, or must satisfy heightened scrutiny under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment, when it singles out a sacred site for complete physical destruction, ending specific religious rituals forever. (Relisted after the Dec. 6, Dec. 13, Jan. 10, Jan. 17, Jan. 24, Feb. 21, Feb. 28, March 7, March 21, March 28, April 4, April 17, April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/ocean-state-tactical-llc-v-rhode-island/">Ocean State Tactical, LLC v. Rhode Island</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-131.html">24-131</a> Issues: (1) Whether a retrospective and confiscatory ban on the possession of ammunition-feeding devices that are in common use violates the Second Amendment; and (2) whether a law dispossessing citizens without compensation of property that they lawfully acquired and long possessed without incident violates the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. (Relisted after the Jan. 10, Jan. 17, Jan. 24, Feb. 21, Feb. 28, March 7, March 21, March 28, April 4, April 17, April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/snope-v-brown/">Snope v. Brown</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-203.html">24-203</a> Issue: Whether the Constitution permits Maryland to ban semiautomatic rifles that are in common use for lawful purposes, including the most popular rifle in America. (Relisted after the Jan. 10, Jan. 17, Jan. 24, Feb. 21, Feb. 28, March 7, March 21, March 28, April 4, April 17, April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/l-m-v-town-of-middleborough-massachusetts/">L.M. v. Town of Middleborough, Massachusetts</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-410.html">24-410</a> Issue: Whether school officials may presume substantial disruption or a violation of the rights of others from a student’s silent, passive, and untargeted ideological speech simply because that speech relates to matters of personal identity, even when the speech responds to the school’s opposing views, actions, or policies. (Relisted after the Feb. 21, Feb. 28, March 7, March 21, March 28, April 4, April 17, April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/first-choice-womens-resource-centers-inc-v-platkin/">First Choice Women’s Resource Centers, Inc. v. Platkin</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-781.html">24-781</a> Issue: Where the subject of a state investigatory demand has established a reasonably objective chill of its First Amendment rights, is a federal court in a first-filed action deprived of jurisdiction because those rights must be adjudicated in state court? (Relisted after the April 4, April 17, April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/ghp-management-corp-v-city-of-los-angeles-california/">GHP Management Corp v. City of Los Angeles, California</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/24-435.html">24-435</a> Issue: Whether an eviction moratorium depriving property owners of the fundamental right to exclude nonpaying tenants effects a physical taking. (Relisted after the April 17, April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) <a></a><a></a><a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/nicholson-v-w-l-york-inc-dba-cover-girls/">Nicholson v. W.L. York, Inc. dba Cover Girls</a>, <a href="https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/23-7490.html">23-7490</a> Issue: Whether the continuing violations doctrine applies to claims premised on a pattern or practice of discrimination, or instead applies only in the context of hostile work environment claims. (Relisted after the April 25, May 2 and May 15 conferences.) The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/05/from-police-powers-to-pork-supreme-court-faces-broad-range-of-new-relists/">From police powers to pork: Supreme Court faces broad range of new relists</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 15 min read

Politics

Court upholds federal fraud conviction even without economic harm

<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/AgxO6sR-wypOk8RU-KbVrXn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="Court upholds federal fraud conviction even without economic harm" title="Court upholds federal fraud conviction even without economic harm"> The Supreme Court on Thursday upheld the fraud conviction of a Philadelphia-area government contractor. Stamatios Kousisis was found guilty, along with Alpha Painting and Construction, after they failed to comply with a contract provision intended to promote diversity. Prosecutors insisted that federal wire fraud laws apply equally to cases in which the defendant uses deception to enter into a transaction that doesn’t harm the victim financially. On Thursday, the justices agreed. The court in recent years has resisted what it sees as the federal government’s overly expansive readings of federal fraud laws, so Thursday’s decision was a relatively rare victory for federal prosecutors in that area. Kouisisis, Alpha, and their business partners won contracts on two major construction projects in the Philadelphia area: a bridge over the Schuylkill River and repairs at Amtrak’s 30th Street Station. As part of the contracts, they were required to work with “disadvantaged business enterprises.” Alpha indicated that it would use a paint supplier, Markias, that was a DBE. But Markias was merely a pass-through that did not supply any paint to the projects. Instead, other suppliers sent Markias invoices; Markias then added a small mark-up and sent its own invoices to Alpha. Alpha and Kousisis were indicted on federal wire fraud charges. The government relied on a theory known as “fraudulent inducement” – the idea that Kouisisis and Alpha obtained the contracts by making deceptive promises to use a disadvantaged business enterprise. Alpha and Kousisis countered that under the fraudulent inducement theory, the government must show that they intended to harm the victim financially – which they did not do. But the lower courts disagreed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit stressed that participation by a disadvantaged business enterprise was “an essential part of the contract.” Kousisis was convicted and sentenced to 70 months in prison, while Alpha was required to pay a $500,000 fine and forfeit its profits from the contracts. In an opinion by Justice Amy Coney Barrett, the Supreme Court on Thursday upheld the 3rd Circuit’s decision, rejecting the argument by Kousisis and Alpha that they could not be held liable unless the government had suffered a financial loss. “The fraudulent-inducement theory,” Barrett wrote, “is consistent with both the text of the wire fraud statute and our precedent interpreting it.” Starting with the text of the wire fraud statute, Barrett explained that the law simply requires someone to “devise” or “intend to devise” a scheme to “obtain money or property” through “false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” The fraudulent-inducement theory, she stressed, does exactly that, as this case shows: “By using Markias as a pass-through entity,” Kousisis and Alpha “‘devised’ a ‘scheme’ to obtain contracts through feigned compliance with PennDOT’s disadvantaged-business requirement.” The goal of that scheme, she continued, was to obtain “tens of millions of dollars” from PennDOT by “making a number of ‘false or fraudulent … representations’ — first about their plans to obtain paint supplies from Markias and later about having done exactly that.” The Supreme Court has also “twice rejected the argument that a fraud conviction depends on economic loss,” Barrett continued, citing the cases of <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/484/19/">Carpenter v. United States</a> and <a href="https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/580/15-5991/">Shaw v. United States</a>. And she emphasized that regardless of the theory on which prosecutors rely, a conviction under the wire fraud statute at issue in this case “requires that ‘money or property’ have been an object of the fraudster’s scheme.” Such a requirement, she observed, also distinguishes the wire fraud law from laws that prohibit a conspiracy to defraud the United States, which are not limited to schemes to obtain money or property but can instead apply to, for example, efforts to enter the United States. Barrett pushed back against the suggestion by Kousisis and Alpha that upholding the 3rd Circuit’s decision could create fraud liability whenever anyone intentionally misrepresents something as part of a property transaction. First, she noted, the fraud laws require that the misrepresentation be material – that is, significant enough to affect the decision to enter into the transaction. Second, she continued, the fraudulent-inducement theory targets “a particular species of fraud: intentionally lying to induce a victim into a transaction that will cost her money or property.” She acknowledged that the wire fraud statute potentially has a “broad” sweep. “But,” she concluded, “Congress enacted the wire fraud statute, and it is up to Congress—if it so chooses—to change it.” Justice Clarence Thomas joined Barrett’s opinion but wrote a concurring opinion in which he questioned whether the misrepresentations by Kousisis and Alpha were in fact material. “I seriously doubt,” he wrote, “that the DBE provisions can meet this standard.” Justice Neil Gorsuch joined Barrett’s opinion to the extent that it concludes that the wire fraud statute does not require proof that the victim suffered an economic loss. But he questioned a section of Barrett’s opinion indicating that the “wire-fraud statute’s injury requirement is satisfied whenever a defendant ‘obtains … property’ that a victim ‘would not otherwise have parted with’ by means of a material misrepresentation.” Such an approach, he warned, “risks turning prosecutors and courts into morality police with a commission to prosecute and punish harmless lies.” Justice Sonia Sotomayor agreed with the result of Barrett’s opinion – that is, that the lower court’s decision can stand. “When a defendant tricks a victim out of their money by promising one thing and delivering something materially different,” she wrote, “it is no defense to say that the delivered items are of equal economic value.” But she would go no further than that, and she declined to join the majority’s opinion to the extent it “appears to speak more broadly.” The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/05/court-upholds-federal-fraud-conviction-even-without-economic-harm/">Court upholds federal fraud conviction even without economic harm</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 5 min read

Politics

Roumanie : dans les coulisses de la victoire de Nicușor Dan à la présidentielle

Il est 8h30 ce dimanche 18 mai, jour d’élection, et Nicușor Dan essaie de tenir bon. Après des mois de campagne dans la course à…

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 17 min read

General

Nigerian Government Sues Senator Natasha Akpoti For Criminal Defamation, Akpabio and Yahaya Bello to Testify

The federal government has charged Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan for criminal defamation over assassination accusations levied against Akpabio, Yahaya Bello. The post <a href="https://www.arise.tv/nigerian-government-sues-senator-natasha-akpoti-for-criminal-defamation-akpabio-and-yahaya-bello-to-testify/">Nigerian Government Sues Senator Natasha Akpoti For Criminal Defamation, Akpabio and Yahaya Bello to Testify</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.arise.tv">Arise News</a>.

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 2 min read

Politics

‘We Need To Move The Conversation On From Bathrooms,’ Trans Advocacy Group Says

The “third toilet” This April, the UK Supreme Court ruled that the legal definition of a woman within the Equality Act of 2010 is a…

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 3 min read

Politics

Split Supreme Court blocks first religious charter school in Oklahoma

<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/z2mWviCQXLJq5Bdi14Fb4Hn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="Split Supreme Court blocks first religious charter school in Oklahoma" title="Split Supreme Court blocks first religious charter school in Oklahoma"> The Supreme Court on Thursday morning left in place a ruling by the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejecting an effort by a Catholic virtual charter school to become the country’s first religious charter school. In an unsigned one-sentence order, the justices indicated that, with Justice Amy Coney Barrett recused from the case, they had divided 4-4. The order did not indicate how any of the justices voted. That tie means the state supreme court’s opinion remains good law, although it is binding only in Oklahoma and does not have nationwide effect. Barrett did not state why she did not participate in the case. But the charter school was represented at the Supreme Court by the religious liberty clinic at Notre Dame’s law school, where Barrett taught for 15 years before becoming a federal judge and later a justice. And Nicole Stelle Garnett, who is a law professor at Notre Dame and a leading advocate for allowing the use of public funds at religious schools, is a close friend of Barrett’s. Barrett is godmother to one of Garnett’s children. The dispute began in 2023, when Oklahoma’s charter school board approved an application by the archdiocese of Oklahoma City and the diocese of Tulsa to create a virtual Catholic charter school, St. Isidore of Seville, named after the patron saint of the internet. The school was intended to be an explicitly religious one that would participate in “the evangelizing mission of the church.” The school’s contract with the charter school board specifically allowed the school to freely exercise its religious beliefs. Gentner Drummond, Oklahoma’s Republican attorney general, went to the state supreme court, asking it to invalidate the charter school board’s contract with St. Isidore. The state supreme court granted that request. Because St. Isidore is a public school, it concluded, state laws require it to be non-sectarian. That mandate, it added, is consistent with both the state and federal constitution, which bar the state from “using public money for the establishment of a religious institution.” The school and the charter school board came to the Supreme Court last fall, asking the justices to take up their case and reverse the state court’s ruling. Since 2017, the justices have sided with parents and religious institutions in three challenges to state policies that barred them from receiving education-related funds that were available for secular, but not religious, recipients. First, they ruled that <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2017/06/opinion-analysis-church-prevails-funding-dispute/">Missouri violated the Constitution</a> when it barred a church preschool from a state-run program to resurface its playground. In 2020, they ruled that <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/cases/case-files/espinoza-v-montana-department-of-revenue/">Montana could not exclude religious schools</a> from a tax-credit program used to provide funding for children to attend private schools. And in 2022, <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2022/06/court-strikes-down-maines-ban-on-using-public-funds-at-religious-schools/">they invalidated a Maine policy</a> that allowed public funds to be used to pay tuition at non-sectarian schools but not at religious schools. At the April 30 oral argument, several of the justices – including, critically, Chief Justice John Roberts – suggested that the charter school case was different from the trio of cases in which the court had ruled against the state. Those cases, Roberts suggested, “involved fairly discrete state involvement,” while the state’s involvement in the operation of a Catholic virtual charter school would be “a much more comprehensive involvement.” The justices also seemed concerned about what the impact of a ruling either for or against the state might be. On the one hand, Justice Elena Kagan warned, a ruling for the charter school board might require a state to approve a religious school whose curriculum bears little resemblance to a traditional public school. On the other hand, Justice Brett Kavanaugh expressed concern that upholding the Oklahoma Supreme Court’s opinion could mean that other faith-based services, like Catholic Social Services or Catholic Charities, would also be deemed “government entities” that are unable to exercise their religion. After more than two hours of debate last month, the justices appeared divided. Thursday’s order confirmed that with Barrett not participating, they were unable to find five votes for either outcome. The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/05/split-supreme-court-blocks-first-religious-charter-school-in-oklahoma/">Split Supreme Court blocks first religious charter school in Oklahoma</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 4 min read

Politics

Announcement of opinions for Thursday, May 22

<img src="https://api.follow.it/track-rss-story-loaded/v1/-xoWleru0GpinV0hmZTFmHn9ye8UNv30" border=0 width="1" height="1" alt="Announcement of opinions for Thursday, May 22" title="Announcement of opinions for Thursday, May 22"> On Thursday, May 22, we will be live blogging as the court releases opinions in one or more argued cases from the current term. Click <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/faqs-announcements-of-orders-and-opinions/">here</a> for a list of FAQs about opinion announcements. <section class="custom-block"> <div class="arena-embed"> <div class="arena-chat" data-publisher="scotusblog" data-chatroom="l9Nb6rC" data-position="in-page"></div> </div> </section> The post <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com/2025/05/announcement-of-opinions-for-thursday-may-22/">Announcement of opinions for Thursday, May 22</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.scotusblog.com">SCOTUSblog</a>.

mingooland · May 22, 2025 · 1 min read