How Trump the ‘master deal-maker’ failed when it came to negotiating with the Taliban in Afghanistan

News that Ukraine may be ready to sign a deal granting the US joint development rights to its minerals in the hope of a future security guarantee may be seen as a win by Donald Trump’s supporters who criticised Joe Biden’s unconditional support for Ukraine. After all, whether and how this agreement will actually protect Ukraine from continuing Russian aggression remains unclear.

But Kyiv will be well aware that Trump’s track record as an international deal broker is less than stellar, despite the US president’s regular boast that he is a master deal-maker.

Trump’s self-belief was encapsulated in his ghostwritten memoir, The Art of the Deal, which laid out his tactics to negotiate business transactions. One important tip was: “The best thing you can do is deal from strength, and leverage is the biggest strength you can have.”

Last week, Trump left Zelensky, and European nations reeling when he cut them out of talks with Russia over the war in Ukraine. In doing so, the president had arguably forgotten his own advice: to deal from strength and to use leverage in negotiations.

Trump may have extracted a concession from Ukraine in the form of the mineral deal – although far less than the US$500 billion (£394 billion) of revenue he initially demanded – but in doing so he significantly weakened the US position towards Russia.

Trump not only shattered the western position on Ukraine, but he also unilaterally ended Russia’s three-year isolation without securing any concessions from the Kremlin before inviting them to the negotiating table.

Instead, it was the US that gave leverage away by sidelining Ukraine from the talks, rejecting the country’s desire for Nato membership and conceding that Ukraine was unlikely to restore its pre-2014 borders.

Trump further undermined Zelensky by promoting the false claim that Ukraine started the war and calling him a “dictator”. This week, the US even voted with Russia and China at the United Nations security council over the conflict.

Trump’s criticism of an ally and conciliatory overtures to a country that illegally invaded its neighbour marks a dramatic swing in US policy. The previous US administration provided Ukraine with military and diplomatic support, while imposing economic sanctions on Russia.

A key question being asked in Kyiv and western capitals is what else Trump will concede to secure a deal with the Kremlin. While the contexts between the US’s involvement in Afghanistan and support for Ukraine are very different, Trump’s early strategy for the latter has some hallmarks of the US’s disastrous deal with the Taliban.

Trump’s deal with the Taliban

In response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks, a US-led coalition invaded Afghanistan in October 2001. The allies quickly deposed the repressive Taliban regime and installed a western-backed government.

But by the time that Trump came to office in 2017, the war was at a stalemate. To make matters worse for the president, the US was spending US$27 billion (£21.3 billion) annually on military expenditure. Given this, Trump’s reflex was to withdraw from Afghanistan as quickly as possible.

However, the president’s national security team – largely comprised of former and current military generals who did not owe personal loyalty to Trump – persuaded him to increase the US’s commitment to Afghanistan. The new strategy also set the conditions for a negotiated settlement with the Taliban.

The following year, angered by the lack of progress, Trump argued that the US should “get out” of Afghanistan as the strategy had been a “total failure”.

By this time, the US had talked directly to the Taliban, without the Afghan government in the room – a key Taliban demand. While the talks were designed to lead to intra-Afghan negotiations, it resulted in the Afghan republic being sidelined from the process.

Throughout these talks, Trump frequently threatened to withdraw from Afghanistan. US officials referred to this constant threat as the “Tweet of Damocles” – meaning at any point, the president would announce on Twitter that the US was departing Afghanistan.

The secretary of state at the time, Mike Pompeo – a diehard Trump loyalist – knew the president could pull the plug on the talks at any time. He therefore instructed lead US negotiator, Zalmay Khalilzad, to secure a deal at all costs.

As a former senior Pentagon official who was present at the talks told me, it became clear Pompeo and Khalilzad had “no red lines” as both believed that “any deal was better than no deal”.

Khalilzad abandoned the original Afghan-led process and worked to secure an agreement with the Taliban, which inevitably caused dismay within the sidelined Afghan government. Trump also largely refused to consult the Afghan president, Ashraf Ghani, about his plans.

Compounding matters, the US president made several public statements about his desire to withdraw US forces from Afghanistan. This weakened Khalilzad’s position and encouraged the Taliban to remain resolute in negotiations.

The US-Taliban agreement, which was signed in Doha in February 2020, favoured the insurgents and damaged the Afghan government. Khalilzad had conceded to the Taliban’s key demand: the withdrawal of all US and coalition troops from the country, which was scheduled over 14 months.

In return, the Taliban promised to prevent terrorist groups from basing themselves in Afghanistan and agreed to hold talks with the Afghan government. If the Taliban did not adhere to these conditions, the US would – in theory – halt reducing its troop numbers.

“This was a terrible deal. It was deeply injurious to US interests, let alone ruinous to Afghan interests,” the former Pentagon official told me.

In the end, the Taliban failed to honour its counterterrorism commitments, and only half-heartedly pursued intra-Afghan talks.

The deal set the conditions for the insurgents to retake Kabul by force, although the disastrous withdrawal overseen by the administration of Trump’s successor, Joe Biden, in 2021 proved fatal for the Afghan government.

Trump’s Taliban deal excluded the US’s ally, conceded too much to an adversary, and was partly motivated by the perception of wasting American dollars in a far-off land. Unfortunately, these hallmarks are all too evident in the president’s stance on Ukraine.

The early signs of Trump’s approach to talks with Russia do not augur well for Ukraine or the western alliance. If Trump does secure a peace deal with Russia that mirrors the accord struck with the Taliban, not only will Ukraine lose out, but Russia may be emboldened to again pursue its expansionist agenda.

Philip A. Berry does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.