Former Prime Minister John Howard led Australia during two weeks in 2001 that would define the next two decades in Australian politics.
Howard’s decision to dispatch Special Air Service forces to prevent the Tampa, a Norwegian boat carrying 433 rescued asylum-seekers, from entering Australian waters drew international condemnation. But it also played a key role in securing Howard’s domestic position.
Two weeks later, al Qaeda launched the Sept. 11 attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. — soon triggering the U.S.-led war on terror that would see Australian troops deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq. Howard was the only foreign leader in D.C. that day.
He made national security a core issue before Australia’s November 2001 federal election, increasing his conservative government’s margin by declaring: “We will decide who comes to this country, and the circumstances in which they come.”
On the 25th anniversary of the Tampa affair, POLITICO interviewed Australia’s second-longest-serving prime minister about a fortnight that changed the country — and the world.
This transcript has been edited for length and clarity.
What stands out to you about the Tampa 25 years on?
It was an example of Australia setting a standard for dealing with unauthorized arrivals, which was condemned around the world, but over time has now been seen as a sensible way of regulating migration while maintaining public support for migration.
The great thing about what the government did on Tampa was that it demonstrated that if you wanted to maintain public support for a reasonably strong immigration program — in other words, a high number of migrants — you needed to demonstrate a willingness, as well as a capacity, to control the migrants who came to your country. Now, we were condemned at the time for being heartless and insensitive. But with the passage of time, although it is not regularly admitted, other countries have adopted the Australian approach.
Do you see the Tampa affair and then 9/11 two weeks later as the keys to shaping your approach to security and sovereignty — for want of a better phrase, the “Howard Doctrine”?
They were separate — I didn’t link the two, they were linked by the coincidence of time. They both had an impact. Plainly, the Tampa defined for the world our approach to migration. Australia’s always had a strong migration program, and I hope we always do. But you’ve got to demonstrate a willingness to control it, because if you don’t control it, you’ll lose public support. Simple as that. Now, as far as 9/11 is concerned — that was an audacious terrorist attack, which certainly reshaped the world’s attitude towards terrorism. Not just the attitude of the United States and Australia and similar countries, but also the world’s.
On the Tampa specifically, take us into your thinking in the first hours. What were the key decisions you personally had to make?
The key decision was to threaten — and to implement — the use of military force to prevent the Tampa coming to Australia and those on board, therefore, being given the opportunity to obtain some kind of residence in Australia against the wishes of the Australian government. Simple as that. That was my concern. I knew it would be controversial, but I knew it had public support, and I knew it was right.
Did it have uniform support within the cabinet?
Well, yes. Very strong support.
How much do you think it defined the upcoming 2001 election?
It had an impact. My view is that we’d have won that election without either the political impact of Tampa, or of the 9/11 attacks. But probably our majority would have been a bit smaller. We still would have won it. We had a by-election in Aston on July 14. There’s usually a swing against incumbent governments in by-elections, and that didn’t materialize to much of an extent. That indicated that we were back in the game politically.
At the time, the crew on the Tampa was talking about medical conditions that a lot of asylum-seekers were facing.
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We were suspicious of that. Most of the information we got was that that had been exaggerated and was being used as a weapon to intimidate us into changing our attitude. We weren’t going to be lectured by some of those sanctimonious Scandinavian countries.
So you had no moral qualms about that?
Well, there are always moral qualms. One of the pieces of morality in all of this is forgotten: It’s queue jumping. Now, a lot of people have waited very patiently in Indonesia to have their claims for asylum assessed, and if we had bowed to what the people who ultimately became known as the Tampa people wanted, we’d have just run roughshod over the interests of those people who waited so patiently. There’s a lot of morality in that.
How do you view the work of Jane Halton, deputy secretary in [the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet]?
She was a very competent person. I worked with her in various capacities and I had a high regard for her. She was competent. She ended up as secretary of the Department of Finance before she left the public service.
There was a claim in a 2007 biography that the [Attorney-General’s] Department said the response would be illegal. What’s your response?
Well, we thought everything we did was legal.
On the Tampa’s long-term legacy on Australian immigration. Was the Rudd government reversing its decision to scrap offshore processing a validation?
They made a terrible mess of immigration. They pretended beforehand that they would be like us, but they weren’t. They thought they could have their cake and eat it. They thought they could bow before international criticism of our policy yet not really change our policy. Well, he couldn’t do that. You had to be willing to stick to your guns, and we did. They didn’t, and the fact that they eventually capitulated indicated that we’ve been right from the beginning.
You just referred to it as a “coincidence of time” — a few weeks later you were in Washington, D.C., on the morning of 9/11.
I was. I was there originally to give an address to a joint sitting in Congress — only, I think, the third or fourth Australian prime minister ever to have done that. I was doing it to mark the 50th anniversary. It was going to be on the Wednesday. The terrorist attack took place on the Tuesday morning.
What do you remember from that day?
I remember it very clearly. I went for a walk, as was always my custom. When I got back, I was briefed by my press secretary, Tony O’Leary, about an upcoming news conference. That was largely to talk about the pending collapse — if I can put it that way — of Ansett Airways. At the end of that briefing, Tony said to me: “Oh, by the way, there’s been an unfortunate accident. A plane has plowed into one of the Twin Towers.” I said: “Oh, gee, that’s unfortunate.” We thought no more about it. Then 10 minutes later, he banged on my door and said: “You better turn your television set. Another plane has hit the other tower. It’s no accident.” The rest is history.
Were you within viewing distance of the Pentagon?
We were having a news conference a little later, and during that the third plane hit the Pentagon. It was just terrible — the place was in shock. They were remarkably calm, the Americans, and they reacted in a very sensible, deliberate fashion. We were evacuated from the hotel. The American security man in charge of my protection said he hadn’t lost anybody yet, and he didn’t intend to start that day. I and my immediate staff were taken to what could only be called a bunker under the Australian Embassy. Earlier that morning, my wife and one of my two sons came over ostensibly to be there when I spoke to the joint sitting of Congress. But of course, that didn’t come about. He and my wife had set out for the Pentagon, but they ended up in the bunker with us.
With the passing of time, it’s easy to think of history as being inevitable. Did you realize on that morning how far-reaching the consequences of 9/11 would be?
That’s impossible to answer. It’s impossible to know. It was certainly an extraordinary event, and the psychological impact was massive on everybody. But I’d be plucking it out of the air to say that I knew exactly what the reaction was. It was obvious to me that the attack had been carried out by terrorists, and pretty quickly advisers around me were identifying Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda operating out of Afghanistan. It was very obvious to me that the Americans would retaliate and would be grateful for any help. They didn’t need help militarily, but gee, they appreciated that we pledged to help them immediately.
One thing that’s different about today is technology. Do you think your more limited access to information shaped any of their responses compared to how a leader might respond today?
No, no. I just knew that as a close ally and friend, a partner in ANZUS, and the beneficiary of American vital help during World War II, Australia had to be there to help the Americans. Full stop.
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